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ALL EMPLOYERS MUST WASH THEIR SPEECH BEFORE
RETURNING TO WORK: THE FIRST AMENDMENT &
COMPELLED USE OF EMPLOYEES’ PREFERRED
GENDER PRONOUNS
Tyler Sherman*
INTRODUCTION
Under an ordinary gloss, it is easy to limit the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause to its black-letter text. Taken purely at face value, the Free Speech Clause only
prohibits the government from making laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”1
The text makes no other direct mention of speech rights, guarantees, or proscrip-
tions.2 However, the First Amendment has a history that is far from literal.3 Indeed,
the ink of the Bill of Rights had scarcely been dry for eight years when President
John Adams signed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 into law.4 Accordingly,
although the First Amendment is oft understood to merely protect the right to speak
freely, it also protects complementary, if textually nonliteral, freedoms.5 Equally
important First Amendment freedoms include the freedom from being coerced to
express the government’s message and the freedom to not say anything at all.6 This
Note examines these implicit freedoms in the context of municipal “pronoun laws,”
specifically those of New York City and Washington, D.C., which require private
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 Id.
3 Irene L. Kim, Defending Freedom of Speech: The Unconstitutionality of Anti-Paparazzi
Legislation, 44 S.D. L. REV. 275, 279 (1999).
4 Id. (describing the constitutional crisis surrounding the Sedition Act in particular). The
Sedition Act was clearly a law abridging the freedom of speech, outlawing all unlawful as-
sembly, spoken discourse, and publication critical of the federal government. Mere criticism
of the government became tantamount to treason. Id.
5 Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing: Constitutionality and Effec-
tiveness, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 498–99 (2016).
6 Id. (describing additional speech rights extending from the First Amendment).
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employers to use the preferred gender pronouns of their employees.7 Rather, because
the First Amendment protects the right not to speak a message with which you
disagree,8 this Note focuses on the First Amendment implications of such pronoun
laws, and whether they represent an unconstitutional instance of compelled speech.
Pronoun laws, as the term is used here, minimally affect the speech rights of the
speaker. As the New York and Washington, D.C., laws indicate, they are primarily
formulated as anti-discrimination statutes, meant to curb hostility and harassment
in the workplace.9 The laws necessitate use of an employee’s preferred pronoun,
essentially coming into effect only when an employee establishes a preference.10
Nonetheless, in requiring employers to use pronouns which they might otherwise
be fundamentally opposed to using, the pronoun laws clearly compel some manner
of expressive conduct.11
Given the current, vitriolic politicization of gender issues on the contemporary
juridical battlefield—such as the political furor surrounding “bathroom bills” and
policies that command that individuals must use restrooms in accordance with the
gender they were assigned at birth12—it would be little surprising if an employer
covered by a pronoun law brought a First Amendment challenge against it. The
question, though, is what would result? In answering that question, this Note sug-
gests that the pronoun laws do not unconstitutionally compel speech.
7 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808.1 (2006); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-101,
-102(23) (2016).
8 See generally W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that
a state law that required school children to say the Pledge of Allegiance violated the First
Amendment).
9 New York City’s law, for example, is generally applicable to all employers and em-
ployees regardless of gender identity, and a simple mistaken use of a pronoun other than the
employees’ preferred pronoun does not constitute a violation of law. NYC COMM’N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF
GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-
102(23) (2016),  available at https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/publications
/GenderID_InterpretiveGuide2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DAE-4UCF].
10 See id. at 4.
11 Id.
12 For examples of political and legal controversies stirred by policies restricting bath-
room use along male/female gender lines, see Robert Barnes & Moriah Balingit, Supreme
Court Takes Up School Bathroom Rules for Transgender Students, WASH. POST (Oct. 28,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-takes-up-school
-bathroom-rules-for-transgender-students/2016/10/28/0eece4ea-917f-11e6-a6a3-d50
061aa9fae_story.html?utm_term=.b9cc087ba25e [https://perma.cc/WDT6-TU42]; Michael
Gordon et al., Understanding HB2: North Carolina’s Newest Law Solidifies State’s Role in
Defining Discrimination, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www
.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article68401147.html [https://perma.cc
/YF5M-6DHC]; G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/cases/gg-v-gloucester-county-school-board [https://perma.cc/N763
-4KYZ] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
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Although a red-letter day arrived with the United States Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,13 which ultimately
ruled unconstitutional the government’s ability to compel individuals to express sup-
port for a government-mandated message,14 the government may still constitution-
ally compel speech,15 or the accommodation of others’ speech,16 and expression in
a motley assortment of ways.17 Some are quite significant. For instance, the federal
government’s ability to compel law schools to permit military recruiters access to
campus equal to that of nonmilitary recruiters, lest the school lose federal funding;18
or, the ability of state governments to compel physicians, twenty-four hours before
performing an abortion, to inform the mother about the nature of the procedure, the
health risks of both childbirth and abortion, as well as the likely gestational age of
the unborn child.19 Others are important, but inoffensive to our understanding of First
Amendment values; for example, requirements that new cars’ showroom stickers
display safety information,20 or that food packages display nutritional content.21
To be sure, as Barnette and its progeny recognize, the First Amendment right not
to speak is equal to the protection of speech in the affirmative sense.22 The right to
refrain from expressing a message with which one disagrees strikes down to the core
of our nation’s constitutional and republican ethics.23 And though few cases are as
extreme as Barnette, where the state of West Virginia compelled students to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance in order to foster American values,24 compelled speech ultimately
implicates the extent and substance of government power.25 Compelled speech thus
brings the same concerns as government circumscription of affirmative expression.
In light of the concerns surrounding compelled speech, this Note outlines the
various considerations that courts have taken into account when upholding instances
of compelled speech or accommodation of another’s speech.26 For example, whether
13 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
14 Id. Specifically, the Court ruled unconstitutional the government’s ability to force stu-
dents to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance. Id. Such, wrote the Court, unjustly
invaded “freedom of mind.” Id. at 637.
15 See generally Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006).
16 See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
17 Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech
and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 541 (2012).
18 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. 47.
19 Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–87.
20 Keighley, supra note 17, at 541.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
23 Id.
24 W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
25 See generally id.
26 Courts have looked, with varying degrees of skepticism, at whether actual speech or
expression is required or, for instance, whether speakers are forced to “alter [their] own
222 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:219
the government itself has compelled a specific message,27 or whether speakers have
a reasonable opportunity to disassociate from the compelled message, signifying
they disagree with it.28 For those considerations and others explored in this Note,
pronoun laws do not violate the First Amendment.
Part I of this Note briefly outlines the New York City and Washington, D.C.,
pronoun laws, describing their implementation, contents, and the penalties for vio-
lating them. Part II places compelled speech in context, outlining the history of
seminal compelled speech cases. It also describes the principal legal foundations that
support the U.S. Supreme Court’s “freedom of mind” notion as the ultimate standard
against compelled speech.
Because no case has expressly litigated the compelled use of gender pronouns,
Part III explores how lower courts have examined similar anti-discrimination laws in
compelled speech cases, and how they have applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s com-
pelled speech precedent. Part III uses lower courts’ application of the compelled speech
doctrine to argue that pronoun laws are not unconstitutional because they ultimately
do not prevent the speaker from expressing her own message. Part IV very briefly for-
wards an alternative argument. Even if courts cannot uphold the pronoun laws under
the compelled speech doctrine, the laws can be upheld as general anti-discrimination
laws given a “listener’s” interest in dignity and freedom from harassment.
I. THE LAWS IN QUESTION
Over the past decade, public entities like major municipalities, school districts,
and public universities across the United States have codified statutes, adopted resolu-
tions, or issued guidelines that mandate employers, teachers, and other officials use, or
at least respect, the preferred gender pronouns (essentially, linguistic parts of speech
used to identify individuals) of employees, students, and others.29 In 2006, the nation’s
capital became one of the first localities to do so,30 explicitly mandating that employers
use employees’ preferred gender pronouns.31 Indeed, Washington, D.C., amended
its municipal regulations to make “[d]eliberately misusing an individual’s preferred
name, form of address or gender-related pronoun” unlawful.32
message.” Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 964 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)).
27 See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 64 (N.M. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (Apr. 7, 2014).
28 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65
(2006).
29 See, e.g., School District of Philadelphia, Policy No. 252: Transgender and Gender
Non-Conforming Students (2016), https://www.philasd.org/src/wp-content/uploads/sites/80
/2017/06/252.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LHF-QTWM]; see also OHIO UNIVERSITY, UNIVERSITY
POLICY 12.021: STUDENT NAMES (2015), https://www.ohio.edu/policy/12-021.html [https://
perma.cc/MA29-9EZE].
30 53 D.C. Reg. 8751, 8755 (Oct. 27, 2006).
31 Id.
32 D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808.2 (2006). The Washington, D.C., Commission on Human
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Similarly, New York City’s Human Rights Law (NYCHRL)33 prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment, public accommodations, and housing on the basis of gender.34
Although the NYCHRL does not plainly mention gender pronouns, the New York
City Commission on Human Rights issued legal guidance explaining that “[i]nten-
tional or repeated refusal to use an individual’s preferred name, pronoun or title” is
a violation of the NYCHRL.35
II. THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COMPELLED SPEECH
Firstly, this Part discusses First Amendment protections that extend beyond
freedom of speech as it is commonly understood. Secondly, it discusses various in-
stances in which the U.S. Supreme Court has either struck down or upheld instances
of compelled speech. This Note will establish the fact that the right not to speak is
equally as fundamental as the freedom to do so. However, the doctrine of compelled
speech is unwieldy, and it is not always clear what speech may permissibly be
compelled, or what “kind” of speech deserves protection. Thus, no truly comprehen-
sive test or doctrine for compelled speech exists, and courts have applied relevant
precedent with varying results.
Moreover, before anything else, it is critical to note that government compelled
speech is not, by any means, a novel phenomenon. In fact, it is ubiquitous.36 The gov-
ernment requires tobacco and alcohol industries to display health warnings on cigarette
and alcohol packaging,37 employers to post notice of working conditions and employee
rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act,38 subpoenaed witnesses to testify in court,39
and citizens and businesses alike to file taxes and other government documents.40
Rights, if it is found that a respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice, can issue fines.
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 200 (1999).
33 Codified at N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-101 (2016).
34 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-101, -102(23) (2016).
35 NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISCRIM-
INATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002);
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2016). The Commission’s administrative decisions have
the force of law. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-125(a) (2016). When the Commission finds
a violation of the NYCHRL, it has the power to issue fines of up to $250,000. N.Y.C., N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE § 8-126 (2016).
36 See Keighley, supra note 17, at 541.
37 Id. (describing examples of government-compelled speech).
38 Workplace Posters, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topics/posters/
[https://perma.cc/BH3C-CTX5] (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (listing statutorily required
workplace notice provisions).
39 Samuel G. Brooks, Note, Confession and Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting: A New
Take on the Constitutionality of Abrogating the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 24 BYU J. PUB.
L. 117, 133 (2009) (describing subpoenas in criminal proceedings and tax disclosures as
circumscriptions of the right to remain silent that do not offend the First Amendment).
40 Id. (describing examples of government-compelled speech).
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A. The Right Not to Speak
It is common knowledge that the First Amendment prohibits the government
from “abridging the freedom of speech,”41 but inasmuch as the First Amendment
protects the freedom of speech generally, the Amendment is not limited to its literal
text; corollary rights fall under its comprehensive reach.42 For instance, the freedom
from being compelled to express a government-mandated message, the freedom from
being forced to accommodate or subsidize the speech of another, and the right not
to speak at all.43 The fundamental, well-nigh inexorable force of the First Amendment
is that it protects the voluntary expression of ideas, shielding the individual who
wishes to speak when another—the government—would have them remain silent.44
Thus, because the First Amendment protects voluntary expression, it necessarily
protects a “concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same
ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.”45
American jurisprudence has long recognized that forcing individuals to express
ideas with which they disagree, or at least ideas which they themselves did not
decide were worthy of expression, poses a threat to liberty and freedom of expres-
sion equal to the threat posed by direct limitations on speech; indeed, it is an un-
controversial argument that laws that compel speech “pose the inherent risk that the
Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress
unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion.”46 Given the American connection to values of individualism
and self-determination,47 it is little surprising that laws or policies mandating the
announcement of a particular message are seen as equally contrary to the constitu-
tional guarantees extending from the First Amendment.48 Thus, arguably, the
difference between compelled speech and compelled silence is not of major constitu-
tional concern, at least to the extent that both may constitute a major constitutional
infirmity.
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated laws compelling individu-
als to express a message other than the individual’s own, initiating the compelled
41 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42 Alexander, supra note 5, at 498–99 (citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S.
405, 410 (2001) and Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988)).
43 Id.
44 Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,”
58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 432 (2016) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)).
45 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Harper, 471 U.S. at 559).
46 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
47 See id.
48 Id.
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speech doctrine with the seminal 1943 case West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, the facts of which constitute a particularly striking example of compelled
speech.49 Following the West Virginia State Legislature’s approval of statutes re-
quiring all West Virginia schools to introduce courses in American civics and “the
[C]onstitutions of the United States . . . for the purpose of teaching, fostering and
perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism,”50 the Board of Edu-
cation adopted a resolution mandating that saluting the American flag and reciting
the Pledge of Allegiance become “a regular part of the program of activities in the
public schools.”51 Refusal to comply was “insubordination,” dealt with through ex-
pulsion of the student, whom the Board would have considered unlawfully absent,
opening up the parent to criminal prosecution.52 In an opinion delivered by Justice
Jackson, the Court struck down the resolution,53 reasoning, in part: “If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”54
Barnette overturned Minersville School District v. Gobitis,55 which the Court
had decided only three years prior.56 The overturning of Gobitis remains an astonish-
ing action, if only because the facts of the case are remarkably similar to those of
49 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
50 Id. at 626 n.1 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (Supp. 1941)).
51 Id. at 626 (citation omitted). In relevant part, the order stated:
Therefore, be it RESOLVED, That the West Virginia Board of Education
does hereby recognize and order that the commonly accepted salute to
the Flag . . . now becomes a regular part of the program of activities in
the public schools, . . . and that all teachers as defined by law in West
Virginia and pupils in such schools shall be required to participate in
the salute, . . . [and] that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an act
of insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly.
Id. at 628 n.2 (citation omitted).
52 Id. at 629.
53 Id. at 624.
54 Id. at 642. Justice Jackson’s statement is fitting, for it was a family of Jehovah’s
Witnesses who challenged the Board’s resolution, believing that God’s law is superior to that
of temporal governments and that they must refrain from pledging faith to any earthly in-
stitution. For a more detailed history of Barnette, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, What We Owe
Jehovah’s Witnesses, HISTORYNET (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.historynet.com/what-we
-owe-jehovahs-witnesses.htm [https://perma.cc/4DHP-PNG5]. It is an interesting historical note
that Jehovah’s Witnesses were, in part, opposed to the salute because, at the time, Jehovah’s
Witnesses were persecuted in Nazi Germany for refusing to show fealty to Adolf Hitler via
the stiff-arm “Heil Hitler” salute. Id. Coincidentally, before the Court decided Barnette, other
parents had raised concerns that the stiff-armed gesture then used to salute the flag was “too
much like Hitler’s.” 319 U.S. at 627.
55 310 U.S. 586, 591 (1940).
56 Id.
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Barnette.57 The Minersville, Pennsylvania, Board of Education required students and
teachers alike to salute the American flag as part of a daily exercise.58 Walter Gobitis,
a Jehovah’s Witness, brought suit after his children were expelled for refusing to
salute the flag on religious grounds.59 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
upheld the school board’s policy,60 holding that the Constitution does not preclude
“legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular
sects.”61 The Court openly embraced the very indoctrination over which Justice
Jackson in Barnette would later exhibit apprehension,62 concluding that it was a
permissible government action to alter students’ minds, and thereby engender na-
tional unity and “evoke in them appreciation of the nation’s hopes and dreams.”63
In Barnette, Justice Jackson waxed poetic about the lofty functions of the First
Amendment, reasoning that the government may not intrude upon students’ self-
rule, lest it erode “freedom of mind” or “invade[ ] the sphere of intellect and spirit”
that the First Amendment protects.64 As scholars have noted, however, Jackson never
explicitly defined “freedom of mind.”65 Nevertheless, Jackson railed against Frank-
furter’s Gobitis opinion, writing that “the flag salute is a form of utterance” and that
sustaining the statutorily compelled flag salute would be akin to holding that the Bill
of Rights does not protect an individual from being forced to “utter what is not in
his mind.”66 Moreover, though he did not explicitly define freedom of mind, Jackson
did go on to write that American government rests on the consent of the governed,
and that governments cannot compel that consent by way of a compulsory Pledge
of Allegiance.67 Government is meant to be “controlled by public opinion, not public
opinion by [government].”68
Clearly, then, Barnette showed that Justice Frankfurter’s conception of First
Amendment prohibitions against compelled speech was not long for this world.
Indeed, not only did the Court overturn Gobitis,69 but it reaffirmed Barnette’s core
principles thirty-four years later in Wooley v. Maynard.70 Chief Justice Burger wrote
57 See id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 592.
60 Id. at 586.
61 Id. at 594.
62 See id. at 597–98; W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
63 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 597.
64 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637, 642.
65 See, e.g., Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL.
W. L. REV. 329, 332 n.6 (2008) (noting that the Court never fully explained what it meant
by “freedom of mind” or how exactly that freedom was violated).
66 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632, 634.
67 See id. at 641–42; Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 343.
68 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
69 Id. at 632–34.
70 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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the majority opinion invalidating a New Hampshire statute mandating that license
plates bear the state’s motto “Live Free or Die.”71 The New Hampshire law made it a
misdemeanor to obscure the motto.72 The Maynards, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses
like the families in Barnette and Gobitis, considered the motto offensive to their
religious beliefs,73 and covered the motto on their license plate.74 Mr. Maynard was
cited for covering the motto.75
In striking down the statute, the Court affirmed the principle that the “freedom
of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”76 In doing so, the
Court bolstered the equivalency of the right to speak and the right not to, directly
stating: “The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complemen-
tary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”77 The
Court lent no serious doctrinal credence to the difference between the passive act of
displaying the state motto on a license plate and being compelled to affirmatively
act and salute the flag.78 Rather, it concluded that the difference is only one of
degree; the underlying unconstitutionality remains.79 Citing Barnette, the Court held
that the relevant point is not, generally speaking, the seriousness of the infringe-
ment,80 but the fact that the State “invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit” that
the First Amendment protects.81 Regardless of whether most people agree with New
Hampshire’s message, the First Amendment protects individuals’ freedom to hold
an opinion different from the government’s or the majority’s and to refuse to pro-
mote an idea that they find morally repugnant.82 Where a State’s interest is to es-
sentially disseminate ideology, that interest cannot outweigh an individual’s right
to avoid becoming a “courier” of that ideology.83
71 Id. at 717.
72 Id. at 707.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 707–08.
75 Id. at 708.
76 Id. at 714.
77 Id. (quoting W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
78 Id. at 715.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 717. One of the government interests that New Hampshire forwarded as support
for the law was the promotion of appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride. Id.
at 716. Though innocuous enough, the Court ruled that the asserted interest was not ideo-
logically neutral. Id. at 717. There were other, more legitimate, means by which New Hampshire
could facilitate an appreciation of history and state pride without coercing citizens into
carrying the message against their will. Id.
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The Court’s invalidation of laws compelling speech did not stop with individu-
als, however, for First Amendment rights regularly intersect with one another. Three
years before Wooley, the Court invalidated a right-of-reply statute in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.84 The Florida statute in question required any newspaper
that attacked “the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election
in any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office,”85
to publish, at the request of the candidate and free of cost, any reply the candidate
may make to the attack.86 Although the Court conceded that Florida’s asserted govern-
ment interest in ensuring the public had access to a wide variety of diverse view-
points may be a valid one, a fundamental constitutional issue endured.87 Unless the
right-of-reply mechanism is purely consensual, the government is left to compel news-
papers to provide candidates access.88 Such coercion, reasoned Chief Justice Burger
writing for the majority, is an invalid penalty based upon the newspaper’s content.89
Chief Justice Burger went on to reason that the statute both compelled and
suppressed speech.90 The statute suppressed speech in that newspapers have limited
print space, and so, when forced to make space for a candidate’s reply, they are left
with less space to print something they would have preferred.91 Moreover, suppres-
sive costs are associated with printing a reply, and editors may choose to avoid the
statutory requirements altogether by not covering the issue at all.92 The latter type
of suppression directly acts against Florida’s asserted interest of diversifying pub-
licly available information, essentially acting as invalid, content-based suppression
based on a newspaper’s particular political coverage.93
84 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
85 Id. at 244 n.2 (citation omitted).
86 Id. at 244. In addition to the reply itself, a newspaper would have to publish a candi-
date’s reply in “as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls
for such reply.” Id. at 245 n.2 (citation omitted). Failure to comply with the right-of-reply
provision constituted a first-degree misdemeanor. Id.
87 Id. at 253–54.
88 Id. at 254.
89 Id. at 256.
90 See id. at 256–57; see also Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 345–46 (explaining Chief
Justice Burger’s reasoning in detail).
91 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
92 Id. at 256–57.
93 See id. Content-based restrictions are seen as especially heinous and fundamentally
contrary to First Amendment principles. For an explanation of content-based restrictions on
free speech, see 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:1
(2016) (“Content-based laws generally trigger heightened scrutiny . . . and when heightened
scrutiny is applied, the odds are quite high that the law will be struck down.”). See generally
Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-
Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199 (1994) (explaining that the government is power-
less to restrict expression because of its particular message, idea, or content).
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The cases described in detail above constitute far from the entire list of the
Court’s compelled speech decisions.94 However, they serve to establish the basic
doctrinal concerns that the Court has grappled with. Tornillo and Wooley at least
represent the fact that in compelled speech cases, the Court is often left with the task
of disentangling two distinct speakers—the individual and the government.95 And
it is abundantly clear, to say the least, that the compelled speech doctrine is nebulous
at best.96 Justice Jackson’s poetic, philosophical “freedom of mind” and “sphere of
intellect and spirit” have never been explicitly defined,97 and it is not always clear
when speech is actually compelled, or when such compulsion is invalid.98 Nor is it
always clear what level of scrutiny must be applied or what kind of government
interest is required to support the regulation of speech.99 The interests of the speaker
and the government must be adjusted and balanced under a compelled speech
doctrine,100 and determining when a government interest renders an otherwise un-
constitutional regulation permissible is a difficult challenge. As discussed in Part III,
lower courts have often been left to make sense of the clunky, indefinite doctrine
and patchwork precedent, with varying results.101
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE BUSINESS CONTEXT: HOW LOWER COURTS
MAY APPLY THE COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE TO PRONOUN LAWS
At the time of this writing, no case has explicitly litigated the mandated use of
preferred gender pronouns. However, relevant anti-discrimination cases implicating
the First Amendment have cropped up across the United States.102 Many have been par-
ticularly newsworthy, including, for instance, bakeries in Colorado and Oregon,103
94 For other compelled speech cases that appeared before the Court, see, for example,
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
572–73 (1995), in which the Court invalidated a Massachusetts public accommodation law,
that required a parade organization to include a lesbian, gay, and bisexual group in its St.
Patrick’s Day parade. Id. The Court concluded that the organization’s First Amendment rights
were violated when it was forced to accommodate another’s speech within its own expressive
activity. Id.; see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006) (holding that the Solomon Amendment, which conditioned law schools’ receipt of fed-
eral funds on their providing military recruiters with the same access as nonmilitary recruiters,
did not unconstitutionally compel law schools to speak a government-mandated message).
95 Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 348.
96 See id. at 331.
97 See id. at 331 n.6; W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 642 (1943).
98 See generally Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006).
99 See Alexander, supra note 5, at 504–08 (describing the standards of review used by the
Court in deciding compelled speech and First Amendment cases).
100 Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 346.
101 See infra Part III.
102 See, e.g., infra notes 103–04.
103 Sarah Larimer, Baker’s Faith-Based Appeal Fails, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2015, at C2.
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and a pizza shop in Indiana that declined to cater same-sex weddings.104 In more
ways than one, the cases track what can be separated into two branches of compelled
speech jurisprudence. On the one hand, there is a pure Barnette track, proscribing
the government from requiring individuals to speak the government’s message.105
On the other, vis-à-vis Tornillo, the second branch essentially holds that not only is
the government prohibited from compelling individuals to speak the government’s
message, but neither can the government coerce individuals into “host[ing] or ac-
commodat[ing] another speaker’s message.”106
A. Pronoun Laws and the First Branch: Compelled Expression of the
Government’s Message
Taken at face value, employers seeking to extricate themselves from the pronoun
laws in New York City and Washington, D.C., could argue that the laws violate both
branches of the compelled speech doctrine.107 For one, actual speech is required in
that employers are compelled to use the pronouns at the behest of the government,108
thus arguably falling under the auspices of the first branch. Secondly, employers are
compelled to use the preferred pronouns of another speaker,109 arguably falling
under the Tornillo branch.
However, it is not clear that courts will ever accept such an argument because,
to date, some lower courts have generally been disinclined, if not altogether opposed,
to First Amendment arguments against anti-discrimination laws.110 Courts’ unwilling-
ness to invalidate anti-discrimination laws under the First Amendment is not particu-
larly surprising. After all, if taken plainly, federal anti-discrimination laws like Title VII
already intrude upon other First Amendment rights like freedom of association.111 One
104 Pizzeria in Gay Protests Reopens, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2015, at A17.
105 James M. Donovan, Half-Baked: The Demand by For-Profit Businesses for Religious
Exemptions from Selling to Same-Sex Couples, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 75 (2016).
106 Id. (citation omitted); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000); see also
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995).
107 See Donovan, supra note 105, at 75–76 (noting that business owners seeking ex-
emption from anti-discrimination laws that require them to serve same-sex couples could
argue that such laws violate both branches of the compelled speech doctrine).
108 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808 (2006); NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY OR
EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2016).
109 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808 (2006); NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON GENDER DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY
OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2016).
110 See, e.g., Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 802–03 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1260 (2012).
111 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (making it unlawful for any employer “to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
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would rightly face disdain for arguing against the substantial justice, both moral and
political, that the Civil Rights Act works, but history is not yet beyond a time when
one can easily conceive of an employer who would choose not to hire potential em-
ployees based upon the color of their skin or because of their sexual orientation.112
As obviously distasteful as blatant racism is to any reasonable person, outside of the
employer-employee context, it remains an employer’s First Amendment right not to
associate with others based upon their race or other intimate characteristics.113 Nor
can the government force an employer to associate otherwise in his personal life.114
To wit: First Amendment freedoms are already abridged, if only incidentally,
by anti-discrimination laws.115 Thus, if the compelling government interest behind
federal laws like Title VII116 can be applied to anti-discrimination laws such as those
of New York City or Washington, D.C., then the constitutional claim may fall flat
to begin with. It is not unreasonable to expect employers, already subject to the anti-
discrimination principles of Title VII, to abide by what is an altogether small burden
on speech.117 Unlike in Barnette or Wooley, no government message is manifestly
appended to requiring the use of an employee’s preferred gender pronoun.118
Apart from the weight of historical disenfranchisement, requiring employers to
use employees’ preferred pronouns is little different from barring employers from
refusing to hire a qualified applicant on the basis of their race.119 The government
is not eroding an employer’s “freedom of mind” or “invad[ing] the sphere of intel-
lect and spirit,” for no government message is required in place of the employer’s.120
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); Crawford v. Willow
Oaks Country Club, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 767, 770 (E.D. Va. 1999) (discussing freedom of asso-
ciation and employment discrimination in the context of private clubs).
112 See, e.g., Max Jaeger, Lawyers Sue Times, CNN, Fox News for Racial Discrimination,
N.Y. POST (Apr. 26, 2017, 11:59 PM), http://nypost.com/2017/04/26/mainstream-media-out
lets-sued-for-racial-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/8L8X-FDTU].
113 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1964).
114 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–20 (1984); see also Eccles v. Nelson,
919 So. 2d 658, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 939 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2006).
115 See generally Crawford, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 770 (stating in part that the First Amend-
ment freedom of association rights of private clubs do not extend to discharge of an employee
whom they had willingly hired, and thus willingly associated).
116 Namely, ending discrimination while vindicating “personal dignity.” See Heart of
Atlanta Motel,  379 U.S. at 250; see also Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
440 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that Title VII’s purpose of eliminating
employment discrimination is generally a “compelling government interest”).
117 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808 (2017); NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON GENDER DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY
OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2016).
118 Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
119 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641
(July 15, 2015).
120 But see Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637, 642.
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Both the Washington, D.C., law and the NYCHRL are generally applicable and only
kick in when an employee expresses a preferred pronoun, not when the government
demands it.121 The pronoun laws, therefore, do not violate the first branch of the
compelled speech doctrine.
B. Pronoun Laws and the Second Branch: Compelled Accommodation of the
Speech of Another
The second branch of the compelled speech doctrine is more difficult to over-
come in the case of mandated use of an employee’s preferred pronouns. As noted,
the government cannot force an individual to “host or accommodate another
speaker’s message.”122 The argument that that is precisely what the pronoun laws do
is more reasonable than an argument that required use of someone’s pronouns is a
government mandated message. In Elane Photography v. Willock,123 however, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico, ruling on a photographer’s First Amendment right
to refuse to photograph a same-sex couple’s wedding, rejected a similar argument.124
In relevant part, Plaintiff Willock, planning to commit to her female partner, contacted
Elane Photography to hire a photographer for a commitment ceremony.125 Elane
Huguenin, the company’s lead photographer, responded, informing Willock that the
company only photographed “traditional weddings.”126 Willock then filed a com-
plaint against Elane Photography with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission,
alleging that the company had discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual
orientation.127 Under New Mexico law, specifically the New Mexico Human Rights
Act, it is unlawful to refuse to serve a client on the basis of sexual orientation.128
In its defense, Elane Photography argued that the “NMHRA compels it to speak
in violation of the First Amendment by requiring it to photograph a same-sex com-
mitment ceremony, even though it is against the owners’ personal beliefs.”129 On the
whole, the Supreme Court of New Mexico was unwilling to accept Elane Photogra-
phy’s First Amendment defense.130 Citing Barnette and Wooley, the court easily dis-
pensed with the first branch of the compelled speech doctrine, reasoning that though
Elane Photography read the cases to mean that the government cannot compel
121 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808 (2017); NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON GENDER DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY
OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2016).
122 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006).
123 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
124 Id. at 59.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 60.
127 Id.
128 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1, -1-7 (2008); see also Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 62.
129 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 63.
130 Id. at 72.
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people “to engage in unwanted expression,” the cases are narrower than such a
reading allows.131 Barnette and Wooley involved situations in which speakers were
compelled to “speak the government’s message.”132 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the NMHRA does not require Elane Photography to speak or display any
government message.133
Nor, reasoned the court, does the NMHRA require the business to take photo-
graphs; the law only mandates “that if Elane Photography operates a business as a
public accommodation, it cannot discriminate against potential clients based on their
sexual orientation.”134 The court expounded upon the idea that the laws in Barnette
and Wooley served little purpose other than to promote a government message, and
that failing to salute a flag or state motto did not bring individual speakers into conflict
with the rights of others.135 Here, however, Elane Photography’s alleged right not to
serve same-sex couples is not only in direct violation of the NMHRA, but conflicts with
Willock’s right to obtain services free from “humiliation and dignitary harm.”136
In this vein, as to the second branch of the doctrine, Elane Photography argued
that, (1) as an expressive service, it should receive the same deference that the parade
organization in Hurley137 received; and (2) if required to photograph same-sex wed-
dings, her approval of those weddings would be implied, even when she does not
wish to convey that message.138 The court was again unwilling to accept Elane
Photography’s compelled speech argument.139 Not only has the U.S. Supreme Court
generally found most anti-discrimination laws to be constitutional,140 but Elane
Photography is a commercial entity, not a privately organized parade.141 Even if the
business has expressive elements, the law applies to Elane Photography as a public
accommodation, not to the merits of the actual photographs or an expressed belief.142
Moreover, the court was distrustful of the argument that, were Elane Photogra-
phy required to shoot same-sex weddings, then “observers will believe that it and
its owners approve of same-sex marriage.”143 Although perception was a factor that
the U.S. Supreme Court considered in Hurley,144 Elane Photography is distinct from
131 See id. at 63–64.
132 Id. at 63 (emphasis added) (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 (2006)).
133 Id. at 64.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See 515 U.S. 557, 557 (1995); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
138 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 65.
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., id. at 65–66 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572).
141 Id. at 66.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 68–69.
144 See 515 U.S. at 575.
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the parade organization.145 Indeed, the court dismissed Elane Photography’s argu-
ment, concluding that, practically speaking, for-hire businesses are not generally
assumed to share or endorse the views of their clients.146 Besides, under the NMHRA,
Elane Photography, as well as its owners, do not lose their First Amendment rights
to express their political and religious beliefs.147 In the court’s words, “Elane Photog-
raphy is free to disavow, implicitly or explicitly, any messages that it believes the
photographs convey,” and it “may, for example, post a disclaimer on their website
or in their studio advertising that they oppose same-sex marriage but that they
comply with applicable anti-discrimination laws.”148
C. The Constitutionality of Pronoun Laws Under an Elane Photography Analysis
Using reasoning similar to that of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, it works
no innovation upon the First Amendment to conclude that “compelled” use of em-
ployees’ preferred pronouns is not a violation of the First Amendment. On the first
track of the compelled speech doctrine, as noted above, neither Washington, D.C.’s
nor New York City’s pronoun law commands a government message.149 Compara-
bly to the NMHRA’s provision that businesses holding themselves out as public
accommodations cannot discriminate against protected classes of people, only indi-
viduals who fall under the definitions—i.e., employers—as laid out in the statutes
are compelled to use the pronouns.150 Neither city’s pronoun law requires them, in
their private lives, to express a message against their “freedom of mind.”151 Again,
Wooley and Barnette prevent the government from compelling individuals to “speak
the Government’s message.”152
145 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 68 (distinguishing Elane Photography from Hurley).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 70.
148 Id. Here, the court cited Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47 (2006). The court implied that, like in Rumsfeld, where law schools were compelled
only to provide access to military recruiters, there is nothing in the vein of a government-supplied
message or position that Elane Photography is compelled to endorse. Elane Photography, 309
P.3d at 70. Many law schools, after Rumsfeld, openly published letters explaining their oppo-
sition to military policy. Id. Elane Photography is likewise able to publicly disavow same-sex
marriage, even as they provide public services on an equal basis.
149 See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808.1 (2006); NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY OR
EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2016).
150 See, e.g., NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3
(2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(23) (2016).
151 See id.
152 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 60.
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True, in Elane Photography, on a literal level there was no required “speech.”153
In the case of pronoun laws, literal speech is required, at least whenever an em-
ployee expresses a preference for a particular pronoun.154 But both the NYCHRL
and Washington, D.C.’s law are anti-discrimination laws, which, as the Supreme
Court of New Mexico conceded, have largely been held constitutional.155 Anti-
discrimination laws have critical functions that extend beyond a purpose to “pro-
mote the government-sanctioned message.”156 Furthermore, much as the NMHRA
did not require Elane Photography to take photographs at all,157 let alone photo-
graphs depicting or supporting same-sex marriage, neither New York City nor
Washington, D.C., mandates that an employer or other covered official express sup-
port for, or even acknowledgment of, gender nonconformity.158 Both laws essen-
tially, and only, mandate that, if individuals act as employers or other covered classes,
they cannot “[i]ntentional[ly] or repeated[ly] refus[e] to use an individual’s preferred
name, pronoun or title”159 because such discriminatory harassment establishes a
hostile work environment.
The second branch of the compelled speech doctrine presents greater difficulty.
For, unlike in Elane Photography, where businesses holding themselves out as
public accommodations were only prohibited from discriminating against protected
classes, here, as noted, actual speech is required.160 Also, the required speech is
literally based upon the preference of another individual.161 Clearly, employers, in
being required to use the preferred pronouns of employees, are being compelled to
accommodate another’s speech. Nonetheless, as in Elane Photography, employers
153 See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59 (explaining that the conduct at issue was
refusal of service to a same-sex couple, not traditional “speech”).
154 See, e.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808.2(a) (2006) (requiring employers to use an em-
ployee’s preferred pronoun).
155 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 65. Specifically, the court stated: “Antidiscrimination
laws have important purposes that go beyond expressing government values: they ensure that
services are freely available in the market, and they protect individuals from humiliation and
dignitary harm.” Id. at 64.
156 Id.; see, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1969) (explaining that Title VII’s
function was to remove the “daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials
of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public”).
157 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 64.
158 See, e.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808 (2006); NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY OR
EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN CODE § 8-102(23) (2016).
159 NYC COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISCRIM-
INATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002);
N.Y.C. ADMIN CODE § 8-102(23) (2016).
160 See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 68 (stating that NMHRA applies to Elane
Photography’s business decision not to offer services to protected classes of people).
161 Id. at 70 (“[T]he allocation of work time is a matter of personal preference, not com-
pelled speech, and it is not constitutionally protected.”).
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are likely to own or manage commercial entities. Even if the service that the busi-
ness provides is expressive, the act of employing an individual, and maintaining a
nonhostile workplace, is not.162 Employment, in and of itself, is not an expressive
act,163 and mandated use of pronouns, unlike the accommodation law at play in
Hurley,164 does not fundamentally change the nature of an expressive act.165 The
laws in question apply to business or employment operations, not an act comparable
to the parade in Hurley.166
Much like the Supreme Court of New Mexico, we should also be skeptical of
arguments that observers, such as customers, will believe that employers support the
use of nontraditional pronouns or gender conformity simply because they use an
employee’s particular pronoun. Just as the court ruled in Elane Photography,
employers do not lose their own First Amendment rights to free expression under
either New York City’s or Washington, D.C.’s human rights law. Employers and
other covered individuals remain free to express their political, religious, and other
opinions.167 They are free to post signs declaring their religious or political support
for traditional gender norms, they remain free to post disclaimers on their website,
and they even remain free to engage in conversation with customers in order to
explain their beliefs.168 All that is mandated under the human rights laws, however,
is that they do not remain free to harass employees by intentionally and repeatedly
refusing to use a preferred pronoun.169
IV. CONTEXTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Throughout this Note, there have been several mentions of the typical contextual
considerations that courts have undertaken when examining cases of compelled
speech.170 Like the Barnette track of cases implies, courts may consider whether the
government itself has compelled a specific message,171 or whether the public at large
162 See id. at 65.
163 See id. (“The fact that these services may involve speech or other expressive services
does not render the NMHRA unconstitutional.”).
164 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 557
(1995) (describing initially the Massachusetts public accommodations law at issue).
165 See id. at 559.
166 See id.
167 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 70. The court stated Elane Photography “may, for
example, post a disclaimer on their website or in their studio advertising that they oppose
same-sex marriage but that they comply with applicable antidiscrimination laws.” Id.
168 See, e.g., id. at 69 (stating that a business may disavow third-party messages by posting
its own signs).
169 See, e.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808.2(a) (2006) (stating that deliberately misusing
an individual’s preferred pronoun may constitute evidence of unlawful harassment and
hostile environment).
170 See supra Parts II & III (discussing the law and history of compelled speech and the
First Amendment in the business context, respectively).
171 See Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 63. See generally W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v.
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will misattribute the compelled speech as being expressly supported by the speaker.172
Courts may also consider the type of space where the speech takes place,173 or whether
speakers have an actual opportunity to disassociate from the compelled speech.174
This Note suggests that where the government itself has not mandated an ideological
message, the latter question is more important. In instances of compelled speech, do
compelled “speakers” have an opportunity to disassociate from the speech? This is
not only because it is a consideration upon which courts have relied on to a signifi-
cant degree,175 but also because of the underlying foundation of the compelled
speech doctrine as a whole—“freedom of mind.”176 That is to say, the dissociative
inquiry here is the critical question because the compelled-speech concern is less the
required action of speaking, and more the concern that speakers will be forced to
“alter [their] own message” without recourse.177
Contrary to the concept put forward above and suggested in Elane Photography,178
there is an entirely valid argument to be made that we cannot practically expect pri-
vate employers to post signs in their establishments announcing their support for
traditional gender roles. Further, it is not an altogether unreasonable question to ask
whether employers with deeply held beliefs—religious, political, or otherwise—
should have to resort to doing so in the first place. But the contrary point outweighs
the argument. It seems that the point is not so much the methods by which an
employer can disassociate themselves, as much as whether there is a bona fide, rea-
sonable opportunity to do so.179 No legal test is going to turn on whether an employer
or other compelled speaker has the option of posting signs.180 Rather, the lynchpin
in compelled speech for whether a compelled speaker has a bona fide opportunity
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (questioning whether a public program may compel
youth to unite).
172 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 576–77 (1995) (reasoning that, in the context of a parade, in which individuals are con-
sidered to be part of the expressive whole, compelled inclusion of an LGBTQ group is more
likely to be perceived as part of the parade’s message).
173 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 96 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“[O]ur decision is limited to the type of shopping center involved in this case.”).
174 See, e.g., id.; Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
65 (2006); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557 (considering the practicability of disavowing connection
to the compelled inclusion of an LGBTQ group in a parade).
175 See supra notes 94, 173 and accompanying text.
176 W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
177 Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 964 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)).
178 309 P.3d 53, 70 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (suggesting that
Elane Photography could simply post disclaimers in its store or on its website).
179 See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576–77 (considering the practicability of disavowing
connection to the compelled inclusion of an LGBTQ group in a parade).
180 But see Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 69 (stating that persons may disclaim spon-
sorship of specific messages by virtue of state law).
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to disavow the speech is arguably contextual, turning on something of a time, place,
and manner consideration.181
Additional U.S. Supreme Court precedent is relevant here. In PruneYard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, the Court rejected a similar argument, upholding a state law
requiring a shopping center to allow other individuals’ expressive activities on its
property.182 In relevant part, a group of high school students set up a table in the
courtyard of PruneYard shopping center in Campbell, California, seeking to request
support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against “Zionism.”183 The
students disseminated pamphlets and asked patrons to sign petitions, which would
be sent to the President of the United States and Members of Congress.184 The record
before the Court indicated that the students’ activity was peaceful, and PruneYard’s
patrons did not object.185 PruneYard’s security instructed the students to leave.186
The students brought suit, seeking to enjoin PruneYard from denying them access
for the purpose of distributing their petitions.187
Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, ultimately upholding the
decision of the Supreme Court of California, which had held that the California
Constitution protects reasonably exercised speech and petition in shopping centers,
even if the shopping centers are privately owned.188 PruneYard drew comparisons
181 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (considering the
public nature of a shopping mall, the likelihood that customers will associate pamphleteers’
message with the proprietors, and the ability of the proprietor to disavow the pamphleteers’
speech). For a discussion of time, place, and manner restrictions, see United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985) (reasoning that neutral regulations that incidentally
burden speech or govern the time, place, or manner of expression are to be examined in
terms of their general effect); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 295 (1984) (further discussing permissible time, place, and manner restrictions).
182 PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74 (holding that appellants had not demonstrated a burden on
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
183 Id. at 77.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 78, 88. In part, the California Supreme Court’s decision was based off of the size
and purpose of PruneYard. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346–47 (Cal.
1979). The issue in the case was not the property or privacy rights of a singular homeowner
or the owner of a small retail establishment. Id. Instead, PruneYard was a large shopping
center. Id. at 342. Thus, the court held that a small number of orderly individuals soliciting
signatures and handing out pamphlets, under “reasonable regulations” established by the
shopping center, did not have a substantial effect on business operations or PruneYard’s
property rights. Id. at 347. The public interest in peaceful speech outweighed the owner’s
property interest. Id. It is worth pointing out that California’s state constitution contains an
express and affirmative guarantee of freedom of speech, ultimately more broad—at least on
its face—than the United States Constitution’s negative prohibition that the government may
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to Wooley, arguing that the State could not compel a private property owner to use
his property as a forum of speech for others, and that the State cannot constitution-
ally require an individual to participate in the distribution of an ideological message
for the purpose that it will be observed by the public.189 In upholding the ruling,
Justice Rehnquist rejected PruneYard’s comparison.190 Firstly, he wrote, in Wooley
the government itself mandated the message, required that it be posted on property,
used “as part of his daily life,” and forbade covering it up.191 Secondly, PruneYard
is distinguishable from the speaker in Wooley.192 By choice of the owner, PruneYard
is not limited to personal use; instead, it is a shopping center open to the public.193
Nor does the State dictate any specific message.194 Not only is there no risk of dis-
crimination based on a particular message, but patrons are unlikely to assume that the
views of the individuals passing out pamphlets are those of the owner.195 PruneYard,
said Rehnquist, could expressly disavow any support for the message by simply
posting signs disclaiming any sponsorship, and that the speakers are communicating
their own message as permitted by law.196
The Court reached an analogous result in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, in which the Court upheld as constitutional the Solomon Amend-
ment, which denied federal funding to higher education institutions that refused to
permit military recruiters access to campus and students equal to the access of other
recruiters.197 An association of law schools and law faculty brought suit, arguing, in
part, that allowing access to the military recruiters would be seen as an indication
that they found nothing objectionable about the military’s policies, when they actually
did.198 The Court, citing PruneYard, rejected the argument.199 Nothing about military
recruiting, wrote Chief Justice Roberts, indicates that the law schools support the
military’s policy, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts the schools or
faculty from speaking freely about the Amendment or the military’s policies.200
not abridge freedom of speech. Compare CA. CONST. art. 1, § 2(a), with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
189 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 86–87.
190 Id. at 87.
191 Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
198 Id. at 52. Specifically, the association objected to the military’s then-valid policy of
prohibiting homosexuals from serving in the military. Id. Generally, under the policy indi-
viduals were not eligible for military service if they had engaged in homosexual acts, married
a person of the same sex, or stated that they were a homosexual. Id. at 52 n.1.
199 Id. at 65.
200 Id.
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Any argument that employers do not have the opportunity to disavow the use
of employees’ preferred pronouns should be similarly rejected. It is true, of course,
that pronoun laws should be distinguished from the laws at play in Rumsfeld,
PruneYard, and Elane Photography. As noted earlier, the pronoun laws compel
actual speech, unlike in the previously mentioned cases.201 But, accepting that the
U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts alike have applied a contextual test to the
question of whether compelled speakers have a legitimate opportunity to disavow
the speech, such that their minds remain “free,” then it becomes a disingenuous
argument to say that, under the pronoun laws, employers cannot disavow the use of
preferred gender pronouns.
For, under the contextual considerations that courts have taken into account, the
employment context is not distinguishable enough, to any significant degree, from
the context of a law school or shopping center. That is not to imply significant com-
monality in function, though. Obviously, law schools, shopping centers, and retail
establishments are vastly different enterprises. Rather, the point is that courts have
implicitly focused both on the space and the means available to dissociate from
compelled speech. For instance, Justice Rehnquist, in PruneYard, pointed out the
public nature of the shopping center,202 stating that it is a business establishment where
the public can come and go as they please.203 Justice Rehnquist addressed the easy
means by which PruneYard’s owner could disassociate himself from the activities of
the pamphleteers, saying it would be a simple matter to post signs renouncing support
for anything that they said, and that they were communicating as permitted by law.204
Rumsfeld, too, discussed the ability to disassociate from the compelled speech.205
Although Chief Justice Roberts ultimately concluded that the Solomon Amendment
did not actually regulate speech or inherently expressive conduct, he concluded that
there was little likelihood that law students would not appreciate the difference
between the recruiter’s speech and the law school’s mere facilitating of recruiters’
access.206 In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts compared Rumsfeld to a previous case,
in which the Court held that “high school students can appreciate the difference
between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because [they are]
legally required to do so.”207 In other words, the law school and faculty members
201 In Rumsfeld in particular, the Court found that the Solomon Amendment in question
did not actually regulate or compel speech. See id.
202 Justice Rehnquist also pointed out that it was the choice of the owner to hold PruneYard
out as a shopping center open to the public, rather than limiting for private purposes. 447
U.S. 74, 87 (1980). Quite conceivably, had the owner held the property for private purposes,
the result would have been quite different, without ever reaching the Supreme Court. Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 See generally 547 U.S. at 47–48.
206 Id. at 65.
207 Id. For the case that Chief Justice Roberts discusses, see Board of Education of the
Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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were free to speak otherwise, having a legitimate opportunity to disavow the mili-
tary’s policies, and there was little likelihood that anyone would associate merely
facilitating access for recruiters with the law school’s own message.208
Taking into account similar considerations, then, it is clear that private enter-
prises like restaurants, retail stores, and other service establishments are able to
disassociate from the compelled use of employees’ pronouns.209 Contextually, pri-
vately owned businesses open to the public are not dissimilar enough from a public
accommodation like a shopping center such that patrons would think mere compli-
ance with the law is support for a particular ideological message.210 Nor, to make the
same point, is compliance with anti-discrimination law dissimilar enough from
compliance with the Solomon Amendment such that the required use of pronouns
would convolute the speaker’s own message beyond the point of distinguishabil-
ity.211 Indeed, both Rumsfeld and PruneYard put great faith in the ability of the
public to distinguish support for a message from compliance with the law.212
There is no reason here to discount the ability of the public to distinguish be-
tween compliance with the law and support for gender nonconformance. A distinct,
but still relevant example, is compliance with health codes and notice regulations.
For example, in restaurants and other retail food service enterprises, signs requiring
employees to wash their hands before returning to work are already posted in places
such as bathrooms and kitchens.213 It is fair to say that it is common knowledge that
state or municipal law requires restaurants to post the signs. Moreover, it is common
knowledge that restaurants and other food service businesses are subject to health
inspection and health and safety laws.214 When a restaurant prominently displays a
health grade in the window, visible to patrons as they enter, the public is easily able
to determine that it is by law that a restaurant must post the health grade.215 The con-
stitutionality of such laws is hardly in question, even when—comparable to the
license plate statute in Wooley—some health grade laws directly prohibit obscuring
the sign, divesting the owner of a legal means to disavow the government mandated
message.216 Yet, patrons intuitively do not transpose the government’s message for
the establishment’s.217
The compelling interest in sanitation, and informing potential patrons about health
risks, obviously outweighs any serious constitutional challenge to health-related sign
208 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65.
209 Cf. id.; PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
210 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
211 Cf. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65.
212 Id.; PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87–88.
213 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 113953.5 (West 2007).
214 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.51 (2017).
215 See id.
216 See, e.g., id.; cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
217 Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006);
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87–88.
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posting laws, which at most have de minimis effect on speech.218 And, in fairness,
health laws, as opposed to issues like gender equality and sexuality, are hardly po-
litically charged.219 But the point is not the politicization of the speech, but whether,
contextually, private establishments have the space and the means to disavow the
pronoun laws’ required speech.220 It seems that they do.221
To follow on the previously posed example, because handwashing signs are
already posted in bathrooms and in kitchens, and health grades in windows, it seems
of minimal conceivable burden to—by choice—post a sign disavowing the use of
preferred pronouns and stating that the particular establishment does not subscribe
to a government (or employee’s) “message,” but fully complies with the law. More-
over, as noted before, nothing in the pronoun laws restricts what private employers
may say about the pronoun laws, or even what they may say about gender identity
in general, so long as the employer’s speech does not create a hostile work environ-
ment.222 Thus, both because the pronoun laws do not restrict what employers may
say about the pronoun laws, and because there is small likelihood that the public and
patrons will assume compliance with the law is the employer’s personal message,
private employers have the space to disavow the mandated message.223
Finally, on much the same virtues as the space for speech, private employers
have the means to disavow the mandated speech.224 Though, again, no legal test
should turn on the simple ability to post a sign, private employers remain free to do
218 Compare PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87 (upholding a state law requiring a shopping center
to allow other individuals’ expressive activities on its property because the messages were not
dictated by the state and the center could disavow any sponsorship of the message), with
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 (holding that the government cannot mandate an individual to post
specific government-sponsored messaging on private property for the purpose that it be seen
by the public).
219 See, e.g., Curtis M. Wong, Indiana’s Memories Pizza Reportedly Becomes First Business
to Reject Catering Gay Weddings, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/01/indiana-pizza-gay-couples_n_6985208.html [https://perma
.cc/5BVL-TK3S].
220 Cf. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87.
221 Cf. id.
222 D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808.2 (2006). Granted, there are some additional restrictions
on what an employer may say, in that employers may not disclose the gender of an employee
to others (specifically if the employee is transgender), may not ask questions of a personal
nature about an employee’s gender, or otherwise send communications in such a way that
would alter the conditions of employee’s employment and constitute harassment or create
a hostile workplace. Id. However, this Note would still argue that the additional restrictions
are little different from other labor laws prohibiting workplace harassment, and that they do
not compel speech in the same way as the pronoun-use provision.
223 This Note uses “space” not to denote a physical state of available area, but rather a
permitted margin of variation, or, in other words, the latitude that private employers have to
speak their own message, disavowing anything the government requires. Cf. PruneYard, 447
U.S. at 87.
224 See id.
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so. There is no legal provision preventing employers from posting disclaimers. And
unlike the parade organization in Hurley, employers are not acting in a context where
it would be imprudent or difficult to do so.225 The constitutional question could turn
differently if the pronoun law was overbroad, forbidding any speech or conduct
about gender pronouns. But, as it stands, the law is narrowly tailored to its anti-
discriminatory goal, going so far, in fact, as to give great deference to employers.226
Indeed, Washington, D.C.’s pronoun law specifically enumerates that, in any legal
action under the law, the totality of the circumstances is to be considered, taking into
account whether the misuse of a pronoun was repeated, humiliating, and threatening,
or a mere utterance.227 Thus, employers easily have the means available by which
to disavow their support for nontraditional use of gender pronouns, while simulta-
neously signaling their compliance with law.
In sum, there are laws that have clearly left neither the space nor means to dis-
avow a compelled message.228 One need only look at Barnette, where students were
compelled to physically salute the flag or face expulsion, without the latitude to speak
against the message, or a means to do so that would not also result in expulsion.229
Here, however, there is no such lack of space or means. The pronoun laws in ques-
tion are tailored to their purpose, limiting neither the space given to employers to
speak against the law, nor the means by which they can do so.230
V. AN ALTERNATIVE: ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND THE LISTENER INTEREST
The Supreme Court of New Mexico is not alone in its belief in Elane Photography
that anti-discrimination laws serve legitimate purposes beyond expressing govern-
ment values.231 As mentioned above, instances of courts’ unwillingness to accept
225 Though it seems hyperbolic, this Note uses the repeated example of physical sign
posting because it is an apt, easy-to-implement illustration of a means-based measure that
private employers may take to disavow a message with which they disagree, but with which
they are legally compelled to display. Moreover, it is a reoccurring theme in U.S. Supreme
Court precedent. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 65 (2006); see also PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87. The use of the example of signposting,
however, by no means delimits the available methods by which an employer can disavow the
use of non-traditional pronouns. So long as employers’ communication does not establish ha-
rassment, they are free to use other methods. For instance, they could post a message on their
website. Employers could also simply express their personal opinion to patrons who inquire.
226 D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 4, § 808.1 (2006).
227 Id.
228 See, e.g., W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
229 Id. at 626, 629.
230 Admittedly, this brings up a difficult-to-answer question. How far can an employer go
in speaking against the pronoun laws, or gender nonconformity in general, before that too
constitutes a hostile workplace, thereby chipping away at the purpose of the law?
231 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 64 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
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First Amendment arguments against anti-discrimination laws are evident.232 Indeed,
a Colorado case, Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., reaches a consonant result.233
The facts reflect a familiar pattern. The plaintiffs, a gay couple, visited Masterpiece
bakery to order a cake for their wedding.234 Defendant Phillips informed them that he
could not create a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding due to his religious beliefs.235
The couple left and later filed charges with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, al-
leging discrimination based on sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act (CADA).236
Although the court did not reach the narrow question of whether the act itself
of baking a cake for a same-sex wedding was inherently expressive conduct, in
which case Masterpiece’s First Amendment rights may be at issue,237 the court did
reason that CADA was neutral and generally applicable.238 Thus, the court stated
that only rational basis scrutiny applied,239 in which case CADA was rationally related
to Colorado’s asserted interest in eliminating discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, overcoming any First Amendment concerns.240 Much like the Supreme Court
of New Mexico, though, the court here ruled that baking and selling a wedding cake
to customers on a nondiscriminatory basis “does not convey a celebratory message
about same-sex weddings likely to be understood by those who view it.”241 If any-
thing, said the court, the message was likely to be attributed to the customer.242 More
to the point, however, is the court’s statement that the U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently held that states have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
and that statutes such as CADA serve to further the stated interest.243
Thus, there is a deeper principle than First Amendment protections alone that runs
through the cases discussed above. And even if all of the above is invalid on pure
compelled speech grounds, the law could be upheld simply on the anti-discrimination
principle put forth by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Masterpiece and the Supreme
Court of New Mexico in Elane Photography—the state has a compelling interest in
232 See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
233 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. June 26,
2017) (No. 16-111).
234 Id. at 276.
235 Id. Phillips did, however, inform the couple that he would bake and sell them any other
baked good. Id.
236 Id. at 277.
237 Id. at 288.
238 Id. at 293.
239 Id. at 289, 293.
240 Id. at 293–94.
241 Id. at 286.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 293 (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987) (holding that the government has “a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women in places of public accommodation”)).
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anti-discrimination laws that go “beyond expressing government values.”244 For, “they
ensure that services are freely available in the market, and they protect individuals
from humiliation and dignitary harm.”245
Anti-discrimination laws generally are thus worthy of an examination in the
context of compelled speech. This Part, therefore, very briefly argues in support of
pronoun laws, as well as the idea that U.S. Supreme Court precedent supports a
different, “listener” interest in speech cases where rights are in conflict. As is ap-
parent from the line of cases discussed, at least in the gender and sexuality context,
there is often conflict between the First Amendment rights of religious organizations
and anti-discrimination legislation like that seen in Colorado, New Mexico, and
New York City.246 If so, assuming employers cite religious or political objections,
then even in light of all of the above, does not compelled speech under pronoun laws
violate a speaker’s “freedom of mind,” the very concept to which Justice Jackson
devoted so much space in Barnette?247
Although this Note has spoken at length about the employers’ ability to retain
their freedom to speak against the pronoun laws, in a sense we are still forced to
answer in the affirmative. Because not only do the pronoun laws compel speech, but
if Justice Jackson is to be believed, then the laws do invade the employer’s freedom
of mind by that very act. Is, then, a state’s basic anti-discrimination principle enough
to withstand the fairly considerable decline of religious freedom arguments upheld
under the First Amendment? The answer is yes, for the reasons stated by the courts
in the cases above.248
But there is another justification in compelled speech cases as well, one that is dis-
tinct from the speaker. That is to say, the listener. Rather than focusing on a speaker’s
“freedom of mind” argument against compelled speech, we can focus also on a
listener interest. Specifically, “a neutral and detached viewpoint from which to de-
cide which speaker in compelled speech cases should prevail.”249 As one commenta-
tor has noted, listeners, typically the public, have fundamental interests in hearing
information from a variety of sources, free from government distortion.250 At base, the
listener interest is an adequate, succinct explanation for the implicit First Amendment
244 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 64 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
245 Id.
246 Id. at 70–71; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 293–94; NYC COMM’N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS
OF GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION: LOCAL LAW NO. 3 (2002); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE
§ 8-102(23) (2016).
247 See generally Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
248 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 72–73, 75; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at
288, 291–92.
249 Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 335.
250 Id. at 334.
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prohibition against compelled speech in general.251 Because, as Barnette and Wooley
suggest, government-compelled speech dilutes the pool of information available to
listeners.252 In other words, government-compelled speech violates the First Amend-
ment because the government becomes the ultimate “editor” of everything the listener
hears.253 Quite contrary to the aims of the First Amendment, the government harms
listeners by “amplif[ying] its own message through the mouths of unwilling citizens,
giving listeners a mix of information skewed to the government viewpoint.”254 That
distortion eventually has the effect of interfering, not only with practical enterprises
like deciding how to vote or discovering what information is actually true, but also
with basic autonomy and deciding how to live.255
A substantially similar kind of listener interest supports the pronoun statutes in
New York City and Washington, D.C. As suggested earlier, employers are already sub-
ject to some abridgment of their First Amendment rights under anti-discrimination
laws like the Civil Rights Act.256 An abridgment for which the justification is the rights
of individuals like people of color or women who could otherwise be discriminated
against.257 Specifically, the Court has upheld major anti-discrimination legislation,
such as Title II of the Civil Rights Act, to “vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal
dignity’” that accompanies discrimination.258 Indeed, Justice Brennan wrote of that
vindication, that the “stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that
accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the
basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.”259
By every stretch of the imagination, this justification for the anti-discrimination
laws is a profound listener interest. As opposed, though, to the “neutral,” outside
listener—i.e., the public—at play in Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo, in anti-discrimi-
nation contexts, the listener is far from neutral, because they face indignity and
harm.260 In Wooley, for instance, the neutral, outside listener has an interest in undi-
luted information, where the Maynards are forced to display a government-authored
251 Id.
252 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). See generally W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
253 Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 333.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 374.
256 See, e.g., Crawford v. Willow Oaks Country Club, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 767, 769–70
(E.D. Va. 1999) (discussing freedom of association and employment discrimination in the
context of private clubs).
257 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
258 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel,
379 U.S. at 250).
259 Id.
260 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).
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message.261 The listener, however, is otherwise uninvolved in the conflict between
the speech of the government and the rights of the Maynards, thus remaining
neutral.262 In effect, in ruling based upon the notion of “freedom of mind” and an
abhorrence for a government that can unilaterally “prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics . . . or other matters of opinion,” courts have applied a balancing test
between the government message and the listener’s neutral interest in undiluted
information.263 In Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo, the balance rightly tipped in favor
of the listener interest in undiluted information.264
Anti-discrimination cases, like Elane Photography, which implicate compelled
speech, however, were not decided on a neutral listener interest; rather, they were
arguably decided on a dignitary listener interest.265 Indeed, the Supreme Court of
New Mexico stated in Elane Photography that not only did New Mexico’s Human
Rights Act not unconstitutionally impose a government message, but it had the
purpose of protecting individuals from discrimination, and thus, from “humiliation
and dignitary harm.”266
Where cases of compelled speech involve anti-discrimination statutes like the
pronoun laws of New York City and Washington, D.C., the case could turn on the
weight of dignitary harm and the compelling interest the state has in ending discrim-
ination.267 That is to say, where there is a clear state interest in ending discrimina-
tion, and without the law in place, dignitary harm likely results to the listener, then
the law may yet be constitutional.
If not on the grounds of pure compelled speech doctrine, then this Note posits
that pronoun laws are constitutional under U.S. Supreme Court precedent upholding
anti-discrimination laws on the basis that they defend individual dignity. Employees
protected by the pronoun laws clearly have a listener interest in being addressed
consonantly with their gender identity.268 And as the recipient of their employer’s
speech, employees are subject to the unique harm that results if consistently harassed
in a manner that devalues their identity.269 And though the employer’s “freedom of
mind” may be affected as a result, the “stigmatizing injury” to the listener employee
surely outweighs any incidental chilling of the employer’s speech. The laws have an
important purpose that “go beyond expressing government values.”270 They vindicate
261 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; see also Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 399.
262 Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 399.
263 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637, 642.
264 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256–57; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
265 See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 64–65 (N.M. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
266 Id. (emphasis added).
267 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964).
268 Sacharoff, supra note 65, at 333–35.
269 Id. at 333–34.
270 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 at 64.
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“the deprivation of personal dignity”271 that complements discrimination and harass-
ment in the workplace.
CONCLUSION
Since Justice Jackson’s poetic opinion in Barnette, the notion that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from requiring an individual to speak the
government’s message has remained a principle equal in consequence to the prohibi-
tion on laws curbing speech in the affirmative sense.272 That government might
become puppet master is a threat equal to government as censor; both distort the
total pool of information available to citizens, and impugn upon individuals’ right
to decide for themselves.273 Indeed, the foundation of the compelled speech doctrine
remains the principle of “freedom of mind.”274
This Note has focused on exceptions to this golden rule of American constitu-
tionalism, however. Specifically, this Note has focused on pronoun laws—laws that
require employers to use the preferred gender pronouns of their employees. In doing
so, it has concluded that pronoun laws are constitutionally valid. But it has not done
so lightly. Pronoun laws, however slight the abridgment of speech may be, compel
individuals to accommodate the message of another. Although the effect of the
pronoun laws on the speaker is minimal, the difference between being compelled to
use an employee’s preferred pronoun and being compelled to salute the United States
flag is naturally only one of degree.
Despite this conclusion of validity, however, during the writing of this Note, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop.275 Because
this Note relied, in part, on the factually similar Craig and Elane Photography v.
Willock,276 the Court’s decision could naturally affect the analysis leading to the
conclusion that pronoun laws are constitutionally valid. With the recent confirma-
tion of conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Court,277 it is possible the Court may
271 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 16 (1964)).
272 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
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275 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. June 26,
2017) (No. 16-111).
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take a strong stance on First Amendment protection.278 The Court may well overrule
the Court of Appeals of Colorado and conclude that public accommodations laws
requiring business owners to provide services for same-sex weddings, against their
asserted religious convictions, violates the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, because pronoun laws do not unreasonably infringe upon a
speaker’s—employer’s—ability to denounce the laws, because the government itself
has not mandated a specific ideology, and because the laws affect a space outside
of private life, the social justice they work is not unconstitutional. To be sure, balanc-
ing the rights of speakers and listeners in cases of compelled speech is a complex,
careful task. The test and the result alike are far from perfect. And laws which com-
pel speech should not escape close constitutional scrutiny. But, as the analysis above
shows, pronoun laws themselves also serve a traditionally constitutional anti-discrimi-
nation purpose, and ought be found constitutional if ever they are challenged.
As this Note also shows, the particular margins of compelled speech doctrine
have never been explicitly defined, leaving courts to sort out individual cases as best
they can. However, future scholarship should continue to examine the hodgepodge
of precedent and consider those constitutional boundaries themselves, as well as new
and evolving compelled speech claims that may inevitably arise.
278 See, e.g., Tejinder Singh, Judge Gorsuch’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, SCOTUS
BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017, 11:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuchs-first
-amendment-jurisprudence/ [https://perma.cc/9A47-Y8MT].
